A SECOND DEFENCE OF Dr. *Clarke's* DEMONSTRATION OF THE *Being and Attributes of* GOD; IN ANSWER TO THE POSTSCRIPT publiſhed in the Second Edition of Mr. *Law's* Tranſlation of Dr. KING's *Origin of Evil.*

By the AUTHOR *of the Firſt Defence.*

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OF SPACE and DURATION.

METaphyſical Diſputes, if not managed with the utmoſt Candour and Fairneſs, will prevail but little, either in ſettling the Queſtion between the Perſons concerned, or clearing it to the reſt of the World. They who have no other End in their Inquiries, than to find out Truth and Right, can have no Reaſon to depart from a fair Treatment of each other; knowing how weak it is to turn the Arguments they would confute into Ridicule, or to treat Perſons with Contempt undeſervedly; and that ſuch Treatment is as unworthy any Man of Learning and Judgment, as it ought to be beneath the Perſon ſo treated to make any Return of it. Mr. *Law* having publiſhed a ſecond Edition of his *Tranſlation of Archbiſhop* King's *Origin of Evil*, and having

ing annex'd a *Poſtſcript* in Anſwer to the three firſt Parts of My *Defence of Dr.* Clarke, I ſhall here endeavour to make the whole Matter as clear, and give him as plain an Anſwer, as I can.

1. *Firſt* then, I aſſerted that Space was either Something real, diſtinct from *Body* or *Matter*; or elſe in the Inſtance there alledged, there would be no Difference between an Affirmative and a Negative. This Conſequence, the Tranſlator ſays, *p.* 1. is a very lame one; for *the Reaſon why they* (two was) *do not touch, is becauſe they are really* diſtant: *but is* Diſtance *therefore in the abſtract any Thing real? We two differ, or there's a Difference between us, but is* Difference *itſelf anyThing exiſting?* &c. If Things are *really diſtant* from each other, the Diſtance between them is certainly Something real, *viz.* a certain Length of Space. When He explains this by ſaying, *we two differ, or there's a Difference between us*---is *Difference between* us and *Diſtance* the ſame Thing? When we ſpeak of Difference *between* two Things, we mean that there is ſomething in the one which is not in the other: and the Particle *between* does not betoken in this caſe *Diſtance* or *Length of Space*, but only the Conſideration of that which is in the one and which is not in the other, be it what it will. When I aſſerted *Diſtance* or *Length of Space* to be really

ally ſomething, I did not mean that it was a Subſtance; but muſt it therefore be abſolutely *nothing?* are Properties, Relations, *&c.* mere Nothings? If they are, we ſhall find preſently that Subſtances are nothing too, ſince they are only ſo many conſtituent Nothings (Properties) taken together. (*See pag.* 13, 14, *in the Poſtſcript.*) But if Properties are mere Nothings, how come we to talk of *different* Properties, and *different* Relations, and the ſeveral Degrees of them? According to this way of Reaſoning, they are only different Degrees and different Relations of Nothing, that is, no Degrees, nor no Relations at all. And ſo when we talk of the Difference of Subſtances, we mean only that one Subſtance is made up of more or different kinds of Nothings. If there be no *Ideata*, nothing without us to anſwer the Ideas or Notions in our Minds, then we may put one Relation or one Property for another; and we may affirm in all Propriety of Speech, that two Bodies which are twice as far diſtant from each other as two other Bodies are, are yet equally diſtant, becauſe Diſtance is Nothing, and there can be no Quantities no Differences of Nothing. The *Diſtance* that is between two Bodies, which do not touch, is a part of Space, and *Space* is ſomething which penetrates and receives all Bodies: the Idea of which and of its actually Exiſtence (though we ſuppoſe all created

created Beings away) we can by no means get rid of; and therefore ſince it neceſſarily will remain, and ſince it cannot exiſt ſeparately of itſelf; it undeniably proves the Exiſtence of ſome *Subſtance*, whoſe Property it is, and which conſtitutes its Exiſtence.

2. In Anſwer to my ſhowing the Difference between *Whiteneſs* and *Space*, he ſays, *p.* 2. that *Whiteneſs is an abſtract Idea which can have no Subſiſtance of itſelf, and ſo far it agrees with pure Extenſion*, &c. If this be all he means by an *abſtract Idea* (which is far from his Meaning in other Places,) I very readily grant pure Extenſion to be of the ſame Kind: But *pure Extenſion* is not *Space* but a Property of Space, as Whiteneſs is not *Body*, but a Property of *Body*. If you conſider Space as nothing but a *Property*, it cannot ſubſiſt of itſelf, but muſt require ſome *Subſtance* as Whiteneſs does: Yet it does not follow, that it is the *Property* of *Body* only, which is what he ſeems to think through the whole Poſtſcript.

3. What I ſaid concerning the Difference between *Darkneſs* and *Space*, the Tranſlator endeavours to evade the Force of, by ſaying, *ibid.* that he *was ſo far from aſſerting* Darkneſs to be a Capacity of receiving Light, that he *only propoſed it as a parallel piece of Nonſenſe with the former* (with *Space's* Capacity of receiving Body.) Whether he meant the one or the other muſt be judged

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of by his own Words, to which I refer the Reader: however my Argument is equally concluſive, which ſoever he meant, becauſe I proved *Darkneſs* not to be, and not to have a Capacity of receiving Light; for whatever has a Capacity to admit another Thing muſt *exiſt* even whilſt it receives that other Thing: And in this conſiſts the Difference between *Darkneſs and Space* (beſides other Differences between them which the Tranſlator has paſs'd by,) and therefore it could not be *propos'd as a parallel piece of Nonſenſe with the former.* In Anſwer to the Argument, he ſays, *p.* 2. that I *aſſign an accidental Impediment in the Caſe*, &c. What I aſſigned was ſuch an Impediment, if he will call it *an Impediment*, as deſtroys the Tranſlator's Definition of *Darkneſs.* But in truth *the Minuteneſs of the Pores*, cannot be call'd an *accidental* Impediment, becauſe we can never ſuppoſe the Pores that are in the Particles of Light to be quite filled with other Particles of Light, that are ſmaller; for no Particles can be ſuppoſed to fit the Cavities of other Particles ſo exactly as to leave no Cavities between. And the Caſe would be the ſame ſhould we ſuppoſe them ſtill ſmaller (were it poſſible) and ſo on without End. As to the laſt Part, *p.* 3. where he endeavours to turn my Argument upon myſelf, I anſwer, That as Matter is infinitely diviſible, there can be no part of Space ſo ſmall,

ſmall, as to be incapable of receiving ſome Particle of it. Now if *Light*, as *Light*, could be prov'd to be infinitely diviſible, ſo as that a Particle of Light, could be divided infinitely, and that every part of that Particle after every Diviſion ſhould be a Particle of Light, and have the Power of raiſing the ſame Idea in us; the Difference between them muſt be very evident. For there muſt be a part of Space (which abſtractly conſidered may be called *Darkneſs*,) incapable of receiving *Light*, becauſe Light muſt be of ſome determinate Magnitude, otherwiſe it would not be able to affect human Senſes, and conſequently could not be called Light; but there can never be a part of *Space* ſo ſmall, as not to have a Particle of Matter commenſurable to it, though perhaps that Particle can be come at only by an Infinite Being. If this be well conſidered and applied to the Place objected againſt, I believe the whole Caſe will appear very plain.

4. *But*, ſays he, *p.* 3. (in Anſwer to my aſſerting Infinity not to be an actual Addition of finite Spaces, tho' all the Idea, we can get of it, ariſes from thence,) *if all the Idea we can get concerning it, ariſes purely from an endleſs Addition of finite Spaces, then muſt it* (that is, our Idea) *be alſo compos'd of ſuch Portions of that ſame Space, or elſe 'tis ſomething of which we have no Idea*

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at all, &c. This plainly ſuppoſes our *Idea* to be the *thing* itſelf, or an exact *Picture* or *Image* of it, which is in this Caſe the moſt abſurd Thing imaginable. When he ſays, that *Infinity is ſomething of which we have no Idea at all*, if by Idea be meant an Image or an exact Repreſentation of the Thing in our Minds, it is very true, becauſe it is beyond our Comprehenſion; but then 'tis not true that we have no Notion at all of it, or that we do not apprehend clearly that ſomething muſt actually be Infinite. There are a Multitude of Things which we have Ideas of, (by which I mean Objects of our Underſtanding) though we have not *exact Repreſentations and Pictures* of them painted in our Minds. This, I think, is too plain to be inſiſted on.

5. In the next Section, *p.* 4. he ſays, that *I muſt determine this ſame* Thing containing *to be either a Subſtance or Property*, &c. But I think he ſhould have confuted both Dr. *Clarke's* and my Proof that it (Space) was a *Property*, before he required a new One; and that he is far from having confuted either ſhall be ſhown in its proper Place.

6. In the next Section, *ibid.* he plainly ſuppoſes our *Idea* of a *Thing*, to be the Thing itſelf, in imagining Space to be as *the Idea of it is roving indeterminate and perpetually growing*, and therefore, in An-

ſwer, I deſire him to read what he objects againſt over again.

7. The next is much of the ſame Kind; *p.* 5. an Anſwer to it may be ſeen in the Tranſlator himſelf, (Book the firſt, Note the ſeventh) where he tells us, that *Reaſon convinces us that there are many Things of which we can form no Imagination*, and therefore Knowledge can reach beyond Ideas in his Senſe of the Word, *Ideas.*

8. I urged that *Infinity* was an *individual Attribute* of the Deity, and that it was therefore impoſſible it ſhould be the *Attribute* of any Thing elſe, *&c.* To which he replies, *p.* 5. that *Infinity is an Attribute of any infinite Thing, as well as Extenſion is of every Thing extended.* This I apprehended upon a Review I had not ſufficiently explained, and feared there would ariſe from it ſome ſuch Difficulty as this; I ſhall therefore endeavour in this place to explain my Meaning, that it may ſerve for an Anſwer to this Section. The Thing I would have expreſſed is, that as God by exiſting every where, and always properly conſtitutes Eternity and Infinity, therefore ſtrictly and properly ſpeaking there is but one *Infinity*, which is the *Infinity* or *Immenſity* of God which is extended all Ways, which comprehends all Time and Space, that either have been, are, or poſſibly can be. When therefore I aſſerted that it is " impoſſible

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" that *Infinity* could be an Attribute of any " Thing but God"; I meant that no other Being beſides him could conſtitute *Infinity*; and that the *Infinity* of all other Beings would be only a mere Endleſsneſs, becauſe real Infinity would remain though all Beings but God ceas'd to exiſt. So likewiſe what I ſaid about Extenſion is to be underſtood, that if every particular limited Being were deſtroyed, yet ſtill there would be ſuch a Thing as real Extenſion, though the particular limited Extenſion which belonged to thoſe Beings ceas'd; therefore Extenſion cannot be a Property of thoſe Beings, but is the Property of the Deity alone. So alſo in *Knowledge*, every particular Degree of ſuch Knowledge which any Being is poſſeſs'd of, is the Property of every ſuch particular Being, and when any ſuch Being ceaſes to exiſt, the particular Knowledge of that Being ceaſes alſo; but *Knowledge* itſelf ceaſes not, and conſequently *that* can be the Attribute only of the wiſe Creator and Governour of all Things.

9. *When all finite Beings are away*, ſays the Tranſlator, *p.* 6. *all* real *Extenſion goes with them*, &c. When finite Beings are ſuppos'd away, every particular bounded Extenſion belonging to thoſe Beings goes along with them; but to ſuppoſe *Extenſion* itſelf to go too, is a *Petitio Principii*; becauſe it is ſuppoſing it (*Extenſion*) applicable to

none but created Beings, which he expreſsly ſays in another Place, and which ſhall be there more particularly conſidered.

10. I ſaid that it appeared no Contradiction to me to ſuppoſe God to create an *infinite Being*. In Anſwer to this, he ſays, *ibid.* that *it makes him equal to his Creator in ſome one Reſpect, which is as bad as to make him equal in all.* This is a Conſequence I do not ſee: For the *Infinity*, or rather *Endleſsneſs*, of ſuch a Being is merely *dependent* and *contingent*; it is alone from the Good-will and Pleaſure of its Creator, that it ſhould be at all: Whereas the *Infinity* of God is independent and neceſſary, comprehends and penetrates the other, and is therefore as much ſuperiour to it as Independency is to Dependency, or Neceſſity of Exiſtence to mere Contingency and Chance.

11. The Tranſlator had "argued that it "was improper to apply Bounds or Boun-"ders to Non-entity, or Space, which he conſidered as merely Nothing. I anſwered, that this was a direct Contradiction to ſpeak of Space as a *mere Poſſibility*: and argued that to ſpeak of *Non-entity* in general, or to affirm that it is poſſible, that there ſhould be no Being at all exiſting, that is, that there might be an abſolute Nothing, is the greateſt Abſurdity that can poſſibly be imagined. *But*, ſays the Tranſlator, *p.* 7. *with-*

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out this (ſuppoſing Nothing to become Something) *pray where is the Abſurdity* (*I mean* a priori) *in ſaying or ſuppoſing mere Nothing?* &c. If indeed we could not prove *a poſteriori*, that ſomething did always exiſt, we could never have proved *a priori* that ſomething muſt or could not but always have exiſted, and therefore there could have been no Argument *a priori* at all. But this makes nothing againſt our preſent Queſtion; for to ſay that without an Argument *a poſteriori*, the Argument *a priori* could not have been known, is only ſaying, that if no created Beings had ever exiſted; no ſuch Beings could have proved that *ſome* Being has always exiſted, and could not but always have exiſted. By Arguments drawn *a poſteriori*, we prove that there actually does and has always exiſted ſome one unchangeable Being; by Arguments *a priori*, or from the direct Contradiction in the Nature of Things in the contrary Suppoſition, we prove that there could not but have always exiſted ſuch an unchangeable Being.

12. Here, as in ſome Sections foregoing, our *Idea* of a Thing is ſuppoſed to be the Thing itſelf, or elſe it is ſuppoſing *Space* as meaſurable by Poles and Yards to be parallel to *Number* (which no Body denies in that Senſe:) *The Quotation*, he ſays, *p.* 7. *is from a greater than Dr.* Cudworth, *and*

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is ſo far from implying Space and Number to be the ſame Thing, that it is expreſsly introduced as another parallel Caſe; i. e. *parallel to the former only in the Reaſon of their being both incapable of Bounds*, but one is poſitively ſo, and the other negatively. Whether the two following Pages are ſo abundantly confuted, as the Tranſlator thinks, I am very willing to leave to the Reader's Judgment.

13. This Section about *Infinites*, where he ſays, *p.* 8. "a poſitive or abſolute Infinite "is every Way incapable of Addition, the "other Infinite is directly the Reverſe," I think, needs no other Anſwer, but only to refer the Reader to the Places objected againſt, and to leave it to his Judgment, whether we cannot ſuppoſe a Line to be (not have an Idea or Image of a Line) infinitely extended each Way, ſo as to be incapable of any Addition to its Length, and the ſame of a Surface, *&c.*

14. Here again, *p.* 9. the *Thing* is ſuppoſed to be the *Idea*, or the *Idea* to be of the ſame Nature exactly with the *Thing*; for though *we can add to or take from the* Idea *of Duration, can conſider it by* Parts, *&c.* it is no Conſequence that Duration is itſelf increaſible or diminiſhable.

15. I had endeavoured to prove in my former Defence, that God had a *Power* of Creating from all Eternity; this the Tranſlator

lator trys to ſhift off, by ſaying, *p.* 10. that *God could not act without taking up ſome* Time: But this is merely arguing from comparing the Nature of our Actions with the Actions of God, which is too abſurd to be inſiſted upon by any Body; for if God could not act, could not exert his *Power* of Creating from Eternity, the former Conſequence holds good, *viz.* that he exiſted a whole Eternity *a parte ante*, before he had, or before he could exert that or any other Power. I ſhould be glad to ſee the Difference between not having a Power, and having a Power without being able to exert that Power, though indeed the Tranſlator aſſerts, that it is no Defect in a Being not to be able to exert a Power which it has, which is the ſame Thing to me as to ſay that it is no Defect in a Man's Eyes when he cannot ſee. The Caſe in ſhort is this; the one Suppoſition is a direct Contradiction, the other is only inconceivable, and therefore, as the Tranſlator ſays, the *Leſſer* Difficulty *is to be choſen*; and if we alſo conſult his Remarks (*page* 77, *ſecond Edit.*) we ſhall there find a very clear Anſwer to this whole Matter. *On the one Hand*, ſays he, *there is a certain* Alteration *made, a poſitive* Effect *without a* Cauſe; *which is a clear Contradiction. On the other Hand there is a* Difficulty *indeed, but not an apparent Contradiction.* On the one hand

hand there is a plain Diverſity or Alteration in the Deity, which is a clear Contradiction: On the other hand there is a Power ſuppoſed to be exerted, the Manner of which we can by no means underſtand, on this Side therefore is a Difficulty, but not an apparent Contradiction. And again in the ſame Remark. *This may be hard to conceive, but cannot be denied without affirming ſomething worſe, namely, an expreſs Contradiction.* If therefore, by plain Deduction of Reaſon, it can be proved, that God had the *Power* of Creating from Eternity (whether he *actually* exerted *that Power* or no is out of the Queſtion, that depended alone upon his own Good-will and Pleaſure) it evidently follows, that our not being able to conceive it, or there being many Difficulties in ſuch a Suppoſition is no Proof againſt it. What I quoted from the Tranſlator before, and which will ſerve for an Anſwer to ſeveral other Places, is very applicable here, *viz.* That *Reaſon convinces us that there are many Things of which we can form no Imagination.* Neither can it be eſteemed any Anſwer, to ſay, that *Creation from Eternity* was *impoſſible*, and therefore no Defect in God not to be able to do what was impoſſible; for this is ſuppoſing a Thing impoſſible for a whole Eternity paſt, and after that to become poſſible of a ſudden, which equally proves a-

againſt

gainſt the Immutability of God, ſince it is plainly giving him a *new Power*, a *Power* which he was a whole Eternity without, and which it was impoſſible for him to have before.

16. *Laſtly*, ſays he, *p.* 10. *If every Act of Man, as ſuch, is temporary and requires a Beginning, the Caſe muſt be the ſame in God*, &c. This is a Conſequence not to be granted, nor can I ſee, how it would follow from its being *otherwiſe*, that *every divine Act regarding Man or any Thing elſe muſt be Eternal.* Every Action of God that is performed now, or was in any particular Time, requires a *Beginning*; but thoſe Actions, that were from *Eternity* (if God did act from Eternity,) had no *Beginning*, neither did they require any *Beginning*. But does it follow, that becauſe all the Actions of God in any *particular* Time required a *Beginning*, therefore all his Actions in general, that ever were or ever could have been, did: Or that if ſome did not require a *Beginning*, therefore all did not? That if he did *create* any Beings at all from Eternity, *he* therefore *made us* all *from Eternity*; that *every Act of Providence is likewiſe Eternal*, and that whatever may *concern our Poſterity* hereafter, *muſt* alſo *neceſſarily be eternal?* To ſuppoſe God to have a *Power* at one Time, and not at another, is to ſuppoſe a *Change* in Him; but to ſuppoſe

him to *exert* that Power at one time and not at another, juſt as he pleaſes, does not ſuppoſe any Change at all but in his Will. What my Principles will lead to farther, I do not ſee.

17. When a *Suppoſition* is made from clear and plain Demonſtration, as is the Caſe here (which I believe any impartial Perſon, who conſiders the State of the Argument will readily grant,) then all Arguments ariſing from our want of Conception, and which upon that Account overthrow the *Suppoſition* (ſince each Side of a Propoſition cannot be demonſtrated true) are nothing to the Purpoſe. The Caſes are quite different, when we make an *abſurd Suppoſition*, on purpoſe to ſhow its *Abſurdity* (which oftentimes cannot be ſeen ſo clear without firſt making the *Suppoſition*) and when we make a *Suppoſition*, the Poſſibility of which is a neceſſary Conſequence of Demonſtration, and then argue againſt it, becauſe we cannot conceive it.

18. Here the Tranſlator only ſhows, *p.* 12. that we cannot have a *poſitive Idea* of *infinite Space*, which is nothing to the Purpoſe, becauſe *Space* may be *poſitively infinite*, without our having an *Idea* or *Image* of its *Infinity*; for we may and certainly have an *Idea* or *Notion* that it is *Infinite*.

19. That

19. That *Space* is ſomething more than merely mental, was ſufficiently proved in my former Defence, to which I refer the Reader, *p.* 12. If only the Sun and Moon exiſted, *they would properly be in no place at all*, he ſays, *nor could they be ſaid to change Place, only with reſpect to each other.* If this be ſo, Let us ſuppoſe the Sun in the Center, and to turn round its Axis, or round the common Center of Gravity between the Sun and Moon, and the Moon to move round the Sun and about her own Axis in the ſame time, ſo that the ſame Side of the Sun ſhould be always towards the ſame Side of the Moon, and the Diſtance always equal, I ſhould be glad to know (ſince they remain the ſame with relation to each other) whether the Moon was in the ſame Place and ſtood ſtill, all the Time that it turned round the Sun.

20. To urge any Thing againſt arguing about Things above our *Ideas*, will equally prove againſt himſelf, who continually ſuppoſes Things *we can give no Account of*, Things *we can form no Imagination of.* To ſuppoſe a *Subſtance* to be only all its conſtituent *Properties* taken together, *p.* 13. is by no Means ſatisfactory; for if no one of theſe *Properties* can exiſt of it ſelf, neither can they exiſt when taken all together, unleſs they can make one ano-

ther exiſt, (or ſomething be in the whole which is not in any of the Parts) and ſo become *Properties* of *Properties*, or *Properties* inherent in one another, which they muſt be, if they exiſt together, and cannot exiſt any one of them ſeparately. This I am ſure the Tranſlator will not willingly grant.

21. All this whole Section, *p.* 13. is only confounding theſe two Things, *viz. having diviſible Parts*, and *being extended*. Theſe Expreſſions, *beyond our Ideas*, and, *what we can form no Imagination of*, ſeem to me ſynonomous, (*See Sect. 7th above.*)

22. That a *Subſtance* is not only all its *eſſential Properties* taken together, *p.* 14. has been before conſidered, and what was there ſaid, is a ſufficient Anſwer to this whole Section.

23. As for the Paſſage in *Cudworth*, which he charges me with leaving out, he left it out himſelf. I am as willing as he to truſt it with the Reader, who muſt judge for himſelf which Side it makes for.

24. A Being that has an *Idea* of *Infinity*, does not therefore ſee to the End of all Diſtance (that is a Contradiction,) but a Being which ſees that *Space* is not *poſitively infinite*, may properly be ſaid to ſee to the End of all Diſtance, becauſe ſuch a Being ſees that it is not without End.

25.

25. The Difference between *taking a Being from itſelf*, and *taking Exiſtence from a Being*, is this, that the former is a flat Contradiction, becauſe it is ſuppoſing a Being to be taken away, even whilſt it remains. The Latter is not; for to ſuppoſe *Exiſtence* taken away from a *Being*, is only ſuppoſing a *ſine qua non* (or in the Tranſlator's Phraſe *a poſſible Perfection*, without which it could not be) for if Exiſtence be either a *ſine qua non*, a *Mode*, or a *poſſible Perfection*, without which the *Being* ceaſes to exiſt, the taking away *that*, is no Contradiction nor Abſurdity at all.

26. I ſaid that Dr. *Clarke*, when he applied *Properties* to *Space*, did not conſider it ſtrictly as a *Property*, &c. This indeed there was no Occaſion for, becauſe there is no Abſurdity in ſuppoſing *Properties* of Properties, or inherent in one another. Yet if the Tranſlator had conſidered the whole Sentence, he might eaſily have ſeen what I meant, *viz.* not that *Space* was a *Subſtance*, but only that if thoſe *Properties* which Dr. *Clarke* applied to *Space*, were ſuch as could not exiſt in, or belong to, a *Subſtance*, (though they might not ſo accurately be called *Properties of Space*) unleſs *Space* was a *Property* of or belong'd to that *Subſtance* alſo; it was a ſufficient Proof of the Exiſtence of *Space* itſelf, which

which was all I apprehend the Doctor ever intended.

27. In anſwer to what was ſaid of Properties being inherent in one another, he ſays, *p.* 15. *that Figure is nothing excluſive of every particular Shape*, Ergo, *ſo is Extenſion, ſetting aſide every extended Being*, &c. All this I grant, but then I don't ſee how it proves againſt the Queſtion; or that it would follow, ſuppoſing all created Beings to be annihilated, that there would not remain ſome extended Being, which ſeems to be what he aims at; to ſuppoſe there would not, is plainly a *Petitio Principii*. That *Properties* or *Modes* may inhere in one another, the Tranſlator himſelf allows (*page* 69, 2*d Edit.*) *for theſe are Attributes which have a Reference to* Quantity, *and can no more agree to Exiſtence, which is but a* Mode *of Beings, than they can to Neceſſity or Contingence, which are Modes of Exiſtence. Space, Duration, Exiſtence*, and the like, are *Modes, Properties*, or *Perfections* of ſome *Being*. If therefore theſe Perfections really exiſt, it evidently follows, that there is ſome Being which poſſeſſes them or in which they are.

28. To ſuppoſe *Extenſion* and *Duration* as he does, *p.* 16. applicable to none but created Beings, muſt be either begging the Queſtion, or a Conſequence of our getting the

the Ideas of them from created Beings; which latter is what he ſeems to have meant. But if this Conſequence be of Force, it will follow, that whatever we get an *Idea* of from *Created Beings*, muſt therefore be applicable to no other. So that, as the Idea of the Exiſtence of God is (according to himſelf, *pag.* 46, 2*d. Edit.*) entirely got from *Created Beings*, it is therefore applicable to no other Beings: *Ergo*, God does not exiſt. This is a Conſequence, I think, he cannot avoid.

29. *Here*, ſays he, *p.* 16. *we are again got to ſomething* ſupra nos, &c. *Supra nos*, I think may be joined with ſome of the foregoing Terms, *viz. Beyond our Ideas, what we can form no Imagination of*, which ſeem to have the ſame Meaning. *(See Sect. 7th above.)* But this whole Section is only anſwering three Lines, which have nothing to do with the Argument.

30. I had ſaid, that I did not underſtand what he meant by *preſent in his ſimple Eſſence*, he refers me to Dr. *Clarke*, *where*, he ſays, *p.* 17. *I may find another full as hard to underſtand*, &c. But in the Place referr'd to, the Doctor had been before explaining what he meant, whereas the Tranſlator ſeem'd to make him ſay, that God was *co-extended* or *co-expanded with every Point of the boundleſs Immenſity*; but this

this has been ſufficiently explained in my former Defence, *pag.* 57.

31. From the Idea of *Space* being *ſimple*, I urged, that *Space* was really *ſomething* in Nature; to which the Tranſlator objects, *p.* 17. *firſt* that *the Ideas of Space and Duration are not ſimple, but made up of the leaſt portions of each*, viz. *a* ſenſible point *and* Moment. For which he refers us to Mr. *Locke*, who ſays, in the Place referr'd to, that "though our Ideas of Space and Du- "ration may be juſtly reckon'd amongſt "our *ſimple* Ideas, yet none of the diſtinct "*Ideas* we have of either, are without all "Manner of Compoſition." But if theſe *Ideas* are not entirely *ſimple*, but made up of the *ſimple Ideas* of a ſenſible *Point* and *Moment*, the Difficulty ſtill returns, that is, that every *Point* and *Moment* muſt be *ſomething* actually without us, and conſequently that the whole, which is compounded of thoſe *Somethings*, muſt be *Something* alſo. This he endeavours to anſwer, by ſaying, *Secondly*, that *if Space were a ſimple Idea, it would not prove the Exiſtence of any Thing without us*, &c. To which I reply, that we cannot prove the Exiſtence of any Thing at all without us, from a *complex* Idea. As therefore our Proof of the Exiſtence of any Thing, can be only from our *Ideas*; and we having no other Ideas than

ſimple

ſimple and *complex*, it moſt clearly follows, that either *Space* muſt be *ſomething* actually exiſting without us, or nothing at all can be proved to exiſt without us. To ſay we may have a *poſitive Idea* from a *privative Cauſe*, will by no means ſolve the Difficulty; for the Reaſon why we can have a poſitive Idea from a Privation, is, becauſe ſuch an Idea is an Idea of a *Place*, or Part of Space, in which ſomething exiſted, without that Thing; 'tis an Idea of ſome poſitive *real* Place, wherein that Thing had or did ſometimes exiſt. But if our Idea of a Privation, was an Idea only of the *Abſence* of that Thing and of Nothing in its Place, of no Extenſion or Space in which it exiſted; ſuch an Idea would be a poſitive Idea of nothing, which is a direct Contradiction.

Of Neceſſary Exiſtence.

THE chief Reaſon why many Perſons have ſo much ſtuck at the arguing *a priori*, ſeems to ariſe either becauſe they imagine God to be prior to all Things, and that therefore an Argument *a priori* applied to God is to ſuppoſe ſomething prior even to God,

which they think an Abſurdity: Or elſe from their ſuppoſing every Thing to be exactly correſpondent to our Ideas; from imagining that nothing can be otherwiſe than it appears to us, and from confounding the Difference between *formal* and *efficient* Cauſes: All which I believe is wholly owing to Prejudice, becauſe in all other Caſes they allow what they deny here: Thus they allow, that there is an *Eternity* paſt, though it be *inconceivable* even to the moſt Learned; whatever therefore is rejected in one Caſe, ought to be ſo in all other under the like Circumſtances: And, I believe, I could mention an Inſtance where they would allow an *Effect coæval* with its *Cauſe*; but I ſhall now proceed to conſider what the Tranſlator has advanc'd againſt me upon this Head.

1. He objects, to my ſaying, that we might ſee that *two* and *two* were neceſſarily equal to *four*,-- *what? Though we know not the Nature of two and two, or what theſe Words mean?* p. 18. that is, could we ſee that two and two were equal to four, if we did not ſee it? No certainly, but does it therefore follow, that we cannot judge of the *Relation* of Things which we do know, unleſs we likewiſe knew the Eſſence of thoſe Things? Surely we can ſee that there is one ſelf-exiſtent Being, ſupreme Author and Governour of all Things, without knowing the Eſſence

of that Being which we know is infinitely beyond our Reach.

2. From the Abſurdity of an infinite independent Series, we ſee that there has exiſted ſome one independent Being: That *that Being* could not but always have exiſted, is proved from the Argument *a priori*; becauſe if we ſuppoſe no created Beings ever to have exiſted (which is plainly no impoſſible Suppoſition) we ſtill ſee a *Neceſſity* for ſuppoſing, or we cannot poſſibly without a Contradiction not ſuppoſe, the *Exiſtence* of that Being. *A poſteriori* therefore we find that it is true in fact; and *a priori* we find it muſt neceſſarily be ſo, that is, we find that there muſt neceſſarily have been from Eternity one ſelf-exiſtent Being, whether there ever had been any created Beings or no. 'Tis indeed true, that had there never been any created Beings (which is all that can be ſaid on that Side the Queſtion, as was ſhown before) we never could have perceived the Neceſſity of ſuch a ſelf-exiſtent Being; but this is the ſame Thing as to ſay, that we ſhould not have perceived this Neceſſity, had we ourſelves never exiſted, which nobody could be ſo abſurd as to aſſert.

3. *Neceſſity*'s being a relative Term, is no Objection againſt diſtinguiſhing it into two Sorts; for by Neceſſity *abſolute*, I meant that which had no Relation to any Thing but the *Being* itſelf, and by Neceſſity *relative* as

diſtinguiſhed from the former, that which had Relation to the Exiſtence of other Beings.

4. In anſwering what the Tranſlator calls *a very reaſonable Objection*, I aſſerted, that "whatever Number of neceſſary Beings there "were in Nature, there was neceſſarily ſuch "a Number." *But*, ſays he, *p.* 19. *where's the Abſurdity* (a priori) *of ſuppoſing more than one ſuch? Your Argument will ſerve as well for twenty:* viz. *provided we allow them all neceſſary, then none of them can be ſuppoſed away.* Here I find that if we make a Suppoſition, that there are ſuch a Number of ſelf-exiſtent Beings, though it be only made in order to ſhow the Abſurdity of ſuch a Suppoſition, as is continually the Caſe in Mathematicks, we muſt not argue againſt, or bring any Thing that overthrows this Suppoſition, which was laid down, that we might ſee the clearer, the Abſurdities that would ariſe from it, and which would conſequently ſhow the Impoſſibility of ſuch a Suppoſition.

5. The Abſurdity that would conſequently ariſe from this Suppoſition, was to be ſhown in the next Argument, which he ſays, has nothing *to do with the former Objection, becauſe it is no Contradiction to his Ideas in ſuppoſing more than one independent Being; therefore the contrary cannot be demonſtrated.* How this is any Anſwer to my Argument, which

which was to ſhow, that any Number but that which really is, implies a Contradiction in itſelf; and that if we did not perceive the right Number, it would follow, that that which was really no Contradiction appear'd to us a Contradiction, and that which was actually a Contradiction appear'd to be no Contradiction; how what he ſays is an Anſwer to this, I ſay, I cannot ſee. It argues indeed, that in his Mind a great many Things, which are certainly Contradictions in themſelves, are no Contradictions, *i. e.* He does not ſee them; becauſe he can ſuppoſe either one, two, three, or five hundred independent ſelf-exiſtent Beings; one only of which Suppoſitions is poſſible, and all the reſt muſt neceſſarily be Contradictions, notwithſtanding his or any other Perſons Ideas. If it were poſſible that there might be either one, two, or more ſelf-exiſtent Beings, it is plain that they would be neceſſary by Chance or Contingency, which is a flat Contradiction.

That Exiſtence, he ſays, *p.* 20. *which has no prior external Cauſe is abſolutely uncaus'd, I know no other Diſtinction.* This is confounding *formal* and *efficient* Cauſes with each other. I anſwer therefore, that That Being, whoſe Exiſtence has no Reaſon or Foundation may be conceived not to exiſt, I know no other Diſtinction.

7. Here the Tranſlator's Anſwer can be of no Force, *p.* 18. until he has proved that the

the *World* could not poſſibly have been *eternal*, which he has not yet done.

8. *Fitneſs* or *Agreeableneſs* needs no other Relation than what is between the *Action*, and the Nature and Circumſtances of the *Agent*; it is fit for an Agent to act after ſuch a Manner, that is, it is agreeable to the Nature and Circumſtances of that *Agent*. It is no Soleciſm therefore to ſay, that ſuch an *Action* is *fit in itſelf*, ſince it only means that it is agreeable to the Nature and Circumſtances of ſuch or ſuch a Being.

9. It is *right* and *fit*, *p.* 21. that a Creature ſhould reverence its Creator, becauſe the Action of reverencing the Creator, is *agreeable* to the State and Condition the Creature is in; and it is *agreeable* alſo to the Nature of the Creator, becauſe the Creature is dependent upon him. That this is antecedent to any poſitive Command he allows: But how can this be, if it is *right* only becauſe it is *agreeable* to the divine *Will*? How ſhould the Creature know that is is agreeable to the divine *Will*, before any poſitive Command? He muſt firſt know the Foundation of God's *Will*, or ſuppoſe that he *wills* whatever is *right*, and then it is fit for him to act accordingly becauſe it is *right*: Which *Rightneſs* he perceived antecedent to the divine *Will*, which *Will* he took for granted was always agreeable to *Right*, therefore the *Rightneſs* of the Action made it *agreeable*.

10. A

10. A Being that has exiſted from *Eternity*, cannot, for that Reaſon only, be neceſſary. *This Being*, ſays he, *ibid. does not want to be made* (neceſſary,) that is, he ſuppoſes it ſo from its own Nature; but this is only quibling upon the Word *made*. *Not having had a Beginning is no Reaſon indeed* a priori, *why a Being ſhould be neceſſarily exiſtent, but it is a very good one drawn* a poſteriori, *&c.* That it is no more a Reaſon *a poſteriori* than *a priori*, I believe whoever conſiders the Argument for God's creating from *Eternity*, will ſee very plain. In the Inſtance of the Ballance, (be the Laws that govern it what they will) the Difficulty remains as long as the fore-mentioned Argument is concluſive.

11. *A Cauſe coæval with its Effect*, he ſays, *p.* 22. *has been already conſidered*; I anſwer, but not confuted.

12. He ſays, *he ſhould be glad to know what other* (than efficient) *Cauſe, will ſerve my Purpoſe*, &c. I ſhould be as glad to know, who ever aſcribed Operations to a *formal Cauſe*, or *Reaſon*, or what Dr. *Clarke* very juſtly calls a *permanent Ground*.

13. *If he now is*, ibid. *and* could never begin *to be, is there any other poſſible Conſequence but that he muſt have* always *been*, &c. Here we muſt firſt conſider, what Sort of Beings he applies theſe Propoſitions to, and then we ſhall ſee the Want of Connection between them. A Being that did *always* exiſt

exiſt, could never (that is, from the very Manner of its Exiſtence) *begin* to exiſt; but does it thence follow, that it muſt (*neceſſarily*, or 'tis nothing to the Purpoſe) *always* have exiſted, or that it does *neceſſarily* exiſt now. In a Word, the Caſe is plainly this; he ſuppoſes a Being to have always exiſted, and infers from thence (which is no Conſequence at all) that becauſe it did ſo in Fact, it could not but have *always* exiſted, or it did exiſt *neceſſarily* always. His Argument therefore proves only this, that whatever actually did exiſt from Eternity, could not (without ſuppoſing it not to have been eternal) begin to exiſt. But why may I not *ſuppoſe* this Being to have *begun* to exiſt, and therefore not to have been from Eternity? Since it only contradicts the Suppoſition of its being eternal. The Caſe of ſuch a Being's exiſting from Eternity, is only a *contingent* Exiſtence, and in that it agrees with a Being that *will exiſt* to all Eternity; which Being, provided we allow the Suppoſition true, never can ceaſe to exiſt.

14. *The Deity never could derive his Being from any Thing*, Ergo, *he is underived*. But his having exiſted from Eternity, does not imply that (nor is it any Proof to us that) he is underived.

15. Whatever was from Eternity, was never under a Capacity of being changed in any finite Time without a Cauſe or Ground of

of that Change; but if it was from Eternity without any Cauſe, it was from Eternity (though not at any particular Time) poſſible that it ſhould not have been at all, or that it ſhould have been otherwiſe, ſince it might without any Reaſon exiſt after any Manner, provided it exiſted after that Manner from Eternity; nor can its having exiſted from Eternity be any Reaſon, that there cannot be any Cauſe capable of altering or diverſifying its Exiſtence through all the Ages it exiſted in.

16. That it implies a Contradiction *a priori*, to ſuppoſe the ſelf-exiſtent Being not to exiſt, has been ſhown before, though we ſhould not have known, perhaps, that it did ſo, without Arguments *a poſteriori*, which was alſo before conſidered, though no ſuch Thing was ſaid, as that *That* was the Cauſe of the Exiſtence of God.

17. *Having* always exiſted, is no more a Proof that a Being *muſt* always have exiſted, *p.* 24. than *exiſting now* is a Proof that it *muſt* exiſt *now*, or ſhall exiſt hereafter. The Reaſon why we perceive God's Exiſtence *neceſſary*, is becauſe we cannot without a Contradiction ſuppoſe him not to have exiſted *always*, not to exiſt *now*, and not to exiſt to all *Eternity*.

18. *Self-exiſtence* can no more be a Conſequence of *Eternity*, *ibid.* than it is a Conſequence of this *preſent Time*; for to deny

the *Neceſſity* of an *eternal* Being, is no more abſurd than to deny any Being to be neceſſary; becauſe both of them can with equal Eaſe be ſuppoſed not to have exiſted.

19. Here, *p.* 24. I refer the Reader to the Places objected againſt, and he will ſee plainly the want of Correction in the Tranſlator's Propoſitions.

20. We can ſee that created Beings, though they were from Eternity, may ceaſe to exiſt, and might never have exiſted at all; 'tis no Reaſon therefore *a poſteriori*, that what was from Eternity cannot therefore ceaſe to exiſt.

21. If there is no *Reaſon* why an independent Being exiſts, how ſhall we be able to prove its Independency? To ſay we know it from its Eternity, will prove nothing, and was before confuted.

22. From the Conſideration of *Infinity* ariſes an *Idea*, which we cannot poſſibly get rid of; ſo that if we try to ſuppoſe nothing, the Idea of Infinity crouds itſelf along with it, and makes the Contradiction ſtill plainer if poſſible. The Idea of ſomething is a neceſſary *Idea*, ſo that, as the ingenious Author of the Letters to Dr. *Clarke* in his *Boyle's Lectures* ſays, " make what *other* Sup-
" poſition you pleaſe, yet we cannot help
" ſuppoſing *immenſe Space*; becauſe there
" muſt be either an *Infinity of Being*, or
" (if

" (if you'll allow the Expreſſion) an *infi-*
" *nite Vacuity of Being.*"

23. What he ſays in the two following Pages is confounding the Meaning of a *formal* Cauſe; it is ſuppoſing it an actual Producer, it is ſuppoſing the Foundation of the Exiſtence of God to be really in Nature prior to his Exiſtence, which has been ſufficiently explained in my former Defence.

24. In the next Section the Tranſlator after the Words, *I ask once more why it is*, leaves out *and always was*, a Contradiction, *&c.* To anſwer, that *the proper Queſtion ſhould be, what is that Contradiction*, &c. will not ſerve him; for if we ſuppoſe the Deity to have been alone in Nature, (which according to the Tranſlator, *we muſt ſuppoſe him once to have been,*) I aſk whether his Non-exiſtence would not have been then both impoſſible and contradictory? If it would, then 'tis not the *Phænomena* of Nature that ſhow us that he *cannot but exiſt*, for they only ſhow us that he actually does *exiſt*; though without *them* we ſhould not have ſeen the Impoſſibility of his Non-exiſtence. He that can ſee that a Thing may be without a Reaſon, may with as much Reaſon conclude that it was not till he ſaw it.

25. *Why this Neceſſity is that wonderful Thing*, &c. *p.* 27. which he deſires to know, is, becauſe it is the *Foundation* the *permanent*

Ground of the Exiſtence of God. But the Caſe, with Reſpect to God, is quite different: How do we know him to be the greateſt Being, or that there may not be Others as great? Not from his *Eternity*, unleſs we join *Neceſſity* to it. Concerning the antecedent Cauſe and Determination of the divine *Will*, ſee the Places referr'd to in the Poſtſcript.

The TRANSLATOR'S *Demonſtration Examined.*

IN this Particular I ſhall be very ſhort, otherwiſe it would be, as he ſays, to repeat a great many Things, which have been ſaid before; eſpecially relating to *Eternity*, and the *Poſſibility* of God's Creating from *Eternity*; which they who are not convinc'd of, muſt ſee that it is no Defect in a Being that has Power, not to be able to exert that Power, that is, muſt ſee a Power where there is none.

1. He begins anſwering my Argument by repeating his own, *p.* 28. which proves only againſt our *Conception*, and therefore, as Dr. *Bently's* did, proves nothing. A *Series* of Beings exiſting from this preſent Time to all *Eternity*, is exactly of the ſame Nature with a *Series* of Beings that were from *Eternity* down

down to this preſent Time, only the oppoſite Way; for as in the latter there never *was* a firſt, ſo in the former there never *will be* a laſt, they are each of them *terminated* one Way, and *infinite* the other. What he means *by partly infinite and partly finite*, I underſtand not.

2. Either God exiſted a whole *Eternity* without the *Power* of creating, or elſe ſome created Beings might derive their Exiſtence from him from *Eternity:* To ſuppoſe God to be without that Power a whole Eternity *a parte ante*, is evidently a Contradiction; if therefore the other Side *appears* only *ſomething like a Contradiction*, as the Tranſlator expreſſes it, *p.* 29. and does ſo only becauſe it is above our Comprehenſion, it ought not for that Reaſon to be rejected.

3. *One entire endleſs Series*, I own, does not agree to the Nature of ſuch a *Series*; it ſhould rather have been, *one entire beginningleſs Series.* Now *this whole Series* does not mean an *infinite Series* each Way, but only all that of the Series which is now paſt. Where therefore is the Abſurdity in calling it *this whole Series?* or how have I *produced the Doctor's Demonſtration againſt myſelf?* or how can *this* Series *ſo conſidered, deſtroy the Suppoſition as much as a firſt and a laſt?*

4. In Anſwer to my aſſerting that *Created* Beings might eternally ſpring from the Work-

Workmanſhip of the Almighty, as *Light* from the Sun, he ſays, *p.* 30. that *whatever is prior in our Ideas muſt be ſo in Nature*, &c. All the Confuſion which may appear in our ſuppoſing the Sun's Exiſtence from Eternity, and its emitting Light from Eternity, is merely owing to our imperfect Ideas. The Inſtant a luminous Body is created, it emits Light; whether the Motion of the Particles emitted are inſtantaneous, (which they certainly are not,) or no, is nothing to the Purpoſe, the preſent Queſtion being only, whether they could have been emitted from *Eternity*, upon Suppoſition that the Sun exiſted from *Eternity*. I believe whoever conſiders his *Idea* of *Eternity paſt*, will find that the whole Difficulty, ariſes purely from his not being able to conceive it without a Beginning, though he is ſure there could be none; or ſomething very like this. The Inſtance of my Father being no Father till he had a Son, *&c.* is not at all parallel, for though no *created* Beings can be able to beget Sons *coæval* with themſelves; yet I ſee no Abſurdity in ſuppoſing the Deity to be able to do ſo, who always had that unlimited Power, which he now has, and which he can never be deprived of.

5. The Tranſlator refers us to Rg. 2*d Edit.* for a Proof of his Propoſitions, I can ſee no new Proof, and the old One muſt ſtand or fall with his *Notion* of *Eternity*.

6. Dr.

6. Dr. *Clarke* ſays, in the Place referr'd to, that whatever *ſignifies either Difference or Diverſity of Exiſtence is inconſiſtent with Neceſſity*; how this excludes all Perfections of the Deity, I cannot perceive: For as he always had thoſe Perfections, there can be no Diverſity or Difference of Exiſtence in him.

I ſhall conclude with only making the following Obſervation upon *Eternity paſt*, which is what the Tranſlator founds his whole Demonſtration upon; and I ſhall here endeavour to ſhow the Abſurdity of ſuch Way of arguing in a plain Inſtance. *Matter* certainly *exiſts*, this muſt be allowed by every one that will truſt his Senſes; now as *nothing could begin to exiſt without a Cauſe*, whatever *was not eternal could never have exiſted*, therefore *Matter* is *Eternal*, and conſequently, according to the Tranſlator, is *ſelf-exiſtent*. To pretend to prove it not to be ſelf-exiſtent, becauſe ſome Perſons ſuppoſe it to have had a *Beginning*, is plainly begging the Queſtion. To ſuppoſe it Created, will be both begging the Queſtion, and quite inconceivable: For the Action of Creating appears very like a Contradiction; it is ſuppoſing a Power exerted upon nothing, that is, not exerted at all. As *Matter* therefore confeſſedly *exiſts*, and ſince it was not created, it muſt have been from *Eternity*, *Ergo*, it is *ſelf-exiſtent*. This is a neceſſary

neceſſary Conſequence according to the Tranſlator's Way of Arguing; for *Creation* in *Time* is as hard to be reconciled to our Ideas, as *Creation* from *Eternity*; if his Arguments therefore againſt that are concluſive, I humbly apprehend *theſe* here have as much Force; and if theſe are to be rejected, as I think they deſervedly ought to be, ſo ſhould the Tranſlator's, which are built upon as weak a Foundation. I ſhould be very well pleaſed to ſee how the *World* or *Matter* could be demonſtrated not to be *ſelf-exiſtent*, from any other Principle than its manifeſt *Contingency*, or the *Poſſibility* of ſuppoſing it *not to exiſt at all*, or *to exiſt otherwiſe than it does:* And if it is not ſelf-exiſtent, it muſt be created, whatever apparent Abſurdities that implies, ſince the other is a flat Contradiction. So in the Caſe of *Eternity*, if it implies a Contradiction, to ſuppoſe God not to be able to *create* from *Eternity*, the apparent Difficulties on the other ſide, can prove nothing againſt it. This is the Notion I have follow'd throughout this Treatiſe; and as I have no Purſuit hereafter any Thing but Truth, I ſhall be very willing to renounce any Thing here advanc'd that ſhall at any Time hereafter be prove contrary to it.

F I N I S.